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Many organizations are developing autonomous driving systems, which are expected to be deployed
at a large scale in the near future. Despite this, there is a lack of agreement on appropriate meth-
ods to test, debug, and certify the performance of these systems. One of the main challenges is
that many autonomous driving systems have machine learning components, such as deep neural net-
works, for which formal properties are difficult to characterize. We present a testing framework that
is compatible with test case generation and automatic falsification methods, which are used to evalu-
ate cyber-physical systems. We demonstrate how the framework can be used to evaluate closed-loop
properties of an autonomous driving system model that includes the ML components, all within a vir-
tual environment. We demonstrate how to use test case generation methods, such as covering arrays,
as well as requirement falsification methods to automatically identify problematic test scenarios. The
resulting framework can be used to increase the reliability of autonomous driving systems.
1 Introduction
Many groups are developing autonomous driving systems. These systems are on the road now and are
expected to have a significant impact on the vehicle market and the broader economy in the near future;
however, no generally agreed upon testing or verification methods have arisen for these systems. One
reason for this is that the current designs usually include some machine learning (ML) components,
such as deep neural networks (DNNs), which are notoriously difficult to test and verify. We present a
framework for Simulation-based Adversarial Testing of Autonomous Vehicles (Sim-ATAV), which can
be used to check closed-loop properties of autonomous driving systems that include ML components.
We describe a testing methodology, based on a test case generation method, called covering arrays, and
requirement falsification methods to automatically identify problematic test scenarios. The resulting
framework can be used to increase the reliability of autonomous driving systems.
Autonomous driving system designs often use ML components such as DNNs to classify objects
within CCD images and to determine their positions relative to the vehicle, a process known as seman-
tic segmentation [12]. Other designs use neural networks (NNs) to perform end-to-end control of the
vehicle, meaning that the NN takes in the image data and outputs actuator commands, without explic-
itly performing an intermediate step to do the semantic segmentation [30]. Still other approaches use
end-to-end learning to do intermediate decisions like risk assessment [33].
The ML system components are problematic from an analysis perspective, as it is difficult or im-
possible to characterize all of the behaviors of these components under all circumstances. One reason
for this is that the complexity of these systems, in terms of number of parameters, can be high. For
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2 Simulation-based Adversarial Test Generation for Autonomous Vehicles with ML Components
example, AlexNet, a pre-trained, DNN, which is used for classification of CCD images, has 60 million
parameters [23]. Another reason for the difficulty in characterizing behaviors of the ML components
is that the parameters are learned based on training data. Characterizing the ML behaviors is, in some
ways, as difficult as the task of characterizing the training data. Again using the AlexNet example, the
number of training images used was 1.2 million. While a strength of DNNs is their ability to generalize
from training data; the challenge for analysis is that we do not well understand how they generalize for
all possible cases.
There has been significant interest recently on verification and testing for ML components (see
Sec. 2). For example, adversarial testing approaches seek to identify perturbations in image data that
result in misclassifications. By contrast, our work focuses on methods to determine perturbations in the
configuration of a testing scenario, meaning that we seek to find scenarios that lead to unexpected behav-
iors, such as misclassifications and ultimately collisions. The framework that we present allows this type
of testing in a virtual environment. By utilizing advanced 3D models and image rendering tools, such as
the ones used in game engines or film studios, the gap between testing in a virtual environment and the
real world can be minimized.
Most of the previous work to test and verify systems with ML components focuses only on the
ML components themselves, without consideration of the closed-loop behavior of the system. For au-
tonomous driving applications, we observe that the ultimate goal is to evaluate the closed-loop perfor-
mance, and so the testing methods used to evaluate these systems should reflect this.
The closed-loop nature of a typical autonomous driving system can be described as follows. A
perception system processes data gathered from various sensing devices, such as cameras, LIDAR, and
radar. The output of the perception system is an estimation of the principal (ego) vehicle’s position
with respect to external obstacles (e.g., other vehicles, called agent vehicles, and pedestrians). A path
planning algorithm uses the output of the perception system to produce a short-term plan for how the
ego vehicle should behave. A tracking controller then takes the output of the path planner and produces
actuation outputs, such as accelerator, braking, and steering commands. The actuation commands affect
the vehicle’s interaction with the environment. The iterative process of sensing, processing, and actuating
is what we refer to as closed-loop behavior.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows. We provide a new algorithm to perform falsification
of formal requirements for an autonomous vehicle in a closed-loop with the perception system, which
includes an efficient means of searching over discrete and continuous parameter spaces. Our method
represents a new way to do adversarial testing in scenario configuration space, as opposed to the usual
method, which considers adversaries in image space. Additionally, we demonstrate a new way to char-
acterize problems with perception systems in configuration space. Lastly, we extend software testing
notions of covering arrays to closed-loop cyber-physical system (CPS) applications based on ML.
2 Related work
Verification and testing for NNs is notoriously difficult since NNs correspond to complex nonlinear and
non-convex functions. Currently, the methods developed for the analysis of NN components can be
classified into two main categories.
The first category concerns output range verification for a given bounded set of input values [9, 17,
20, 31]. The methods in this category use a combination of Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers,
Linear Programing (LP), gradient-based local search, and Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP).
The second category deals with adversarial sample generation ([29, 34, 28, 27, 14, 4]), which addresses
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the problem of how to minimally perturb the input to the NN so that the classification decision of the
NN changes. If these perturbations are very small, then in a sense, the NN is not robust. The methods
typically employed to solve this problem primarily use some form of gradient ascent to adjust the input
so that the output of the NN changes. The differences between the various approaches relate to whether
the system is black-box or white-box and how the gradient is computed or approximated. Under this
category, we could also potentially include generative adversarial networks [13].
All of the aforementioned methods deal with the verification and testing of NNs at the component
level; however, our work targets the NN testing problem at the system level. The line of research that is
the closest in spirit to our work is [7, 6, 8]. The procedure described in [7, 6, 8] analyzes the performance
of the perception system using static images to identify candidate counterexamples, which they then
check using simulations of the closed-loop behaviors to determine whether the system exhibits unsafe
behaviors. We, on the other hand, provide a new method to search for unsafe behaviors directly on
the closed-loop behaviors of the system, meaning our search uses a global optimizer guided by a cost
function that is defined based on the closed-loop behaviors.
The goals of our approach are similar to those of [26], though their framework is not capable of
simulating the autonomous vehicle system in a closed-loop, including the perception system. In contrast
to our work, their framework utilize a game engine only to visualize the results after the testing and
analysis is done on well defined, but simpler, vehicle dynamic models like a bicycle model, which may
not well represent real behaviors.
Beyond NN-focused testing and analysis, our work borrows ideas from robustness guided falsifica-
tion for autonomous vehicles [35], where the goal is to detect boundary-case failures. Finally, our work
falls under the broader context of automatic test generation methods for autonomous vehicles and driver
assist systems [22, 21], but our methods and testing goals are different.
3 Preliminaries
This section presents the setting used to describe the testing procedures performed using our frame-
work. The purpose of our framework is to provide a mechanism to test, evaluate, and improve on an
autonomous driving system design. To do this, we use a simulation environment that incorporates mod-
els of a vehicle (called the ego vehicle), a perception system, which is used to estimate the state of the
vehicle with respect to other objects in its environment, a controller, which makes decisions about how
the vehicle will behave, and the environment in which the ego vehicle exists. The environment model
contains representations of a wide variety of objects that can interact with the ego vehicle, including
roads, buildings, pedestrians, and other vehicles (called agent vehicles). The behaviors of the system are
determined by the evolution of the model states over time, which we compute using a simulator.
Formally, the framework implements a model of the system, which is a tuple
M = (X ,U ,P,sim),
whereX is a set of system states, U is a set of inputs, and sim is a simulation function
sim :X ×U ×P×T →X ,
where T is a discrete set of sample times t0, t1, . . . , tN , with ti < ti+1. P = W ×V is a combination of
continuous-valued and discrete-valued parameters, where W = W1× ·· · ×WW and each Wi ⊆ R, and
V = V1×·· ·×VV and each Vi is some finite domain, such as Boolean or a finite list of agent car colors.
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Given x ∈ X , xˆ = sim(x,u,p, t) is the state reached starting from state x after time t ∈ T under
input u ∈U and parameter value p ∈P . We call a sequence
U = (u0, t0)(u1, t1) · · ·(uN , tN),
where each ui ∈ U and ti ∈ T , an input trace of M. Given a model M, an input trace of M, U , and
a p ∈P , a simulation trace of M under input U and parameters p is a sequence
T = (x0,u0, t0)(x1,u1, t1) · · ·(xN ,uN , tN),
where sim(xi−1,ui−1,p, ti−1) = xi for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N. For a given simulation trace T , we call X =
(x0, t0)(x1, t1) · · ·(xN , tN) the state trace. We denote the set of all simulation traces of M byL (M).
3.1 Signal Temporal Logic
Signal Temporal Logic (STL) was introduced as an extension to Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) [3] to
reason about real-time properties of signals (simulation traces). STL formulae are built over predicates on
the variables of a signal using combinations of Boolean and temporal operators. The temporal operators
include eventually (♦I ), always (I ) and until (UI ), where I encodes timing constraints.
In this work, we interpret STL formulas over the observable simulation traces of a given system.
STL specifications can describe the usual properties of interest in system design such as (bounded time)
reachability, e.g., between time 1 and 5, x should drop below −10: ♦[1,5) (x ≤ −10), and safety, e.g.,
after time 2, x should always be greater than 10: [2,+∞)(x ≥ 10). Beyond the usual properties, STL
can capture sequences of events, e.g., ♦I1(pi1∧♦I2(pi2∧♦I3pi3)), and infinite behaviors, e.g., periodic
behaviors : (pi1→ ♦[0,2]pi2), where pii are predicates over signal variables.
Informally speaking, we allow predicate expressions to capture arbitrary constraints over the state
variables, inputs and parameters of the system. In other words, we assume that predicates pi are expres-
sions built using the grammar pi ::= f (x,u,p) ≥ c | ¬pi1 | (pi) | pi1 ∨pi2 | pi1 ∧pi2, where f is a function
and c is a constant in R. Effectively, each predicate pi represents a subset in the space X ×U ×P .
In the following, we represent that set that corresponds to the predicate pi using the notation O(pi). For
example, if pi = (x(1) ≤ −10)∨ (x(1)+ x(2) ≥ 10) and we represent by x(i) the i-th component of the
vector x, then O(pi) = (∞,−10]×R∪{x ∈ R2 | x(1)+ x(2) ≥ 10}.
Definition 1 (STL Syntax) Assume Π is the set of predicates and I is any non-empty interval of R≥0.
The set of all well-formed STL formulas is inductively defined as
ϕ ::= > | pi | ¬φ | φ1∨φ2 | ©φ | φ1UI φ2,
where pi is a predicate, > is true,© is Next and UI is Until operator.
For STL formulas ψ , φ , we define
∧φ ≡ ¬(¬ψ ∨¬φ),
⊥≡ ¬> (False),
ψ → φ ≡ ¬ψ ∨φ (ψ Implies φ ),
♦Iψ ≡>UIψ (Eventually ψ),
Iψ ≡ ¬♦I¬ψ (Always ψ),
ψRIφ ≡ ¬(¬ψUI¬φ) (ψ Releases φ )
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using syntactic manipulation.
In our previous work [11], we proposed robust semantics for STL formulas. Robust semantics (or
robustness metrics) provide a real-valued measure of satisfaction of a formula by a trace in contrast to
the Boolean semantics that just provide a true or false valuation. In more detail, given a trace T of the
system, its robustness w.r.t. a temporal property ϕ , denoted [[ϕ]]d(T ) yields a positive value if T satisfies
ϕ and a negative value otherwise. Moreover, if the trace T satisfies the specification φ , then the robust
semantics evaluate to the radius of a neighborhood such that any other trace that remains within that
neighborhood also satisfies the same specification. The same holds for traces that do not satisfy φ .
Definition 2 (STL Robust Semantics) Given a metric d, trace T and O : Π→ 2X ×U ×P , the robust
semantics of any formula φ w.r.t T at time instance i ∈ N is defined as:
[[>]]d(T, i) :=+∞
[[pi]]d(T, i) :=
{ − inf{d((xi,ui,pi),y) | y ∈ O(pi)} if (xi,ui,pi) 6∈ O(pi)
inf{d((xi,ui,pi),y) | y ∈ O(pi)} if (xi,ui,pi) ∈ O(pi)
[[¬φ ]]d(T, i) :=− [[φ ]]d(T, i)
[[φ1∨φ2]]d(T, i) :=max
(
[[φ1]]d(T, i), [[φ2]]d(T, i)
)
[[©φ ]]d(T, i) :=
{
[[φ ]]d(T, i+1) if i+1 ∈ N
−∞ otherwise
[[φ1UI φ2]]d(T, i) := max
j s.t. (t j−ti)∈I
(
min
(
[[φ2]]d(T, j), min
i≤k< j
[[φ1]]d(T,k)
))
A trace T satisfies an STL formula φ (denoted by T |= φ ), if [[φ ]]d(T,0) > 0. On the other hand,
a trace T ′ falsifies φ (denoted by T ′ 6|= φ ), if [[φ ]]d(T ′,0) < 0. Algorithms to compute [[ϕ]]d have been
presented in [11, 10, 5].
Example 3.1 Consider the following dynamical system:
x˙1 = x1− x2+0.1t
x˙2 = x2 cos(2pix2)− x1 sin(2pix1)+0.1t
Sample system trajectories with initial conditions over a grid of 0.05 intervals in each dimension over
the set of initial conditions [−1,1]2 are presented in Fig. 1. Using the specification
ϕ =¬(x ∈ [−1.6,−1.4]× [−1.1,−0.9])
∧¬(x ∈ [3.4,3.6]× [−1.2,−0.8]),
we can construct the robustness surface in Fig. 2. Informally, the specification states that all system
trajectories must always not enter any of the red boxes in Fig. 1. Therefore, any falsifying system
behavior will enter either of the red boxes. Note that the regions of the initial conditions that initiate
falsifying trajectories correspond to negative values in the robustness landscape in Fig. 2.
3.2 Robustness-Guided Model Checking (RGMC)
The goal of a model checking algorithm is to ensure that all traces satisfy the requirement. The robustness
metric can be viewed as a fitness function that indicates the degree to which individual executions of the
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system satisfy the requirement ϕ , with positive values indicating that the execution satisfies ϕ . Therefore,
for a given system M and a given requirement ϕ , the model checking problem is to ensure that for all
T ∈L (M), [[ϕ]]d(T )> 0.
Let ϕ be a given STL property that the system is expected to satisfy. The robustness metric [[ϕ]]d
maps each simulation trace T to a real number r. Ideally, for the STL verification problem, we would
like to prove that infy∈L (Σ)Rϕ(y)> ε > 0 where ε is a desired robustness threshold.
Figure 1: System trajectories.
3.3 Falsification and Critical System Behaviors
In this work, we focus on identifying critical counterexamples, which we refer to as glancing examples.
For the autonomous driving system, and its corresponding requirement, described below, robustness val-
ues that are negative and large in magnitude will correspond to traces where the ego vehicle collides with
an object at high velocity. Glancing counterexamples are those that correspond to robustness values that
are close to 0, where the ego vehicle collides with an object at very low speeds. Glancing counterexam-
ples are valuable for designers, as they provide examples of behaviors at the boundary between satisfying
and falsifying the given property [35]. As discussed in [32], it is important to extract the cases where the
collision is avoidable, instead of failures caused by a pedestrian or an agent vehicle making a maneuver
leading to an unavoidable collision.
To identify critical system behaviors, we leverage existing work on falsification, which is the process
of identifying system traces T that do not satisfy ϕ . For the STL falsification problem, falsification at-
tempts to solve the problem: Find T ∈L (Σ) s.t. [[ϕ]]d(T ) < 0. This is done using best effort solutions
to the following optimization problem: T ? = argminT∈L (Σ)[[ϕ]]d(T ). If [[ϕ]]d(T ?)< 0, then a counterex-
ample (adversarial sample) has been identified, which can be used for debugging or for training. In order
to solve this non-linear non-convex optimization problem, a number of stochastic search optimization
methods can be applied (e.g., [2] – for an overview see [16, 19]).
We use falsification methods to identify glancing examples for an autonomous driving system, where
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Figure 2: The resulting robustness landscape for specification ϕ .
we identify
Tˆ ? = arg min
T∈L (Σ)
|[[ϕ]]d(T )| (1)
as the glancing instance. The minimum of |[[ϕ]]d(T )| for the autonomous driving system, which is usually
0, can be designed to correspond to a trace where a collision occurs with a small velocity.
3.4 Covering Arrays
In software systems, there can often be a large number of discrete input parameters that affect the execu-
tion path of a program and its outputs. The possible combinations of input values can grow exponentially
with the number of parameters. Hence, exhaustive testing on the input space becomes impractical for
fairly large systems. A fault in such a system with k parameters may be caused by a specific combination
of t parameters, where 1≤ t ≤ k. One best-effort approach to testing is to make sure that all combinations
of any t-sized subset (i.e., all t-way combinations) of the inputs is tested.
A covering array is a minimal number of test cases such that any t-way combination of test param-
eters exist in the list [15]. Covering arrays are generated using optimization-based algorithms with the
goal of minimizing the number of test cases. We denote a t-way covering array on k parameters by
CA(t,k,(v1, ...,vk)), where vi is the number of possible values for the ith parameter. The size of covering
array increases with increasing t, and it becomes an exhaustive list of all combinations when t = k. Here,
t is considered as the strength of the covering array. In practice, t can be chosen such that the generated
tests fit into the testing budget. Empirical studies on real-world examples show that more than 90 percent
of the software failures can be found by testing 2 to 4-way combinations of inputs [24].
Despite the t-way combinatorial coverage guaranteed by covering arrays, a fault in the system possi-
bly may arise as a result of a combination of a number parameters larger than t. Hence, covering arrays
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are typically used to supplement additional testing techniques, like uniform random testing. We consider
that because of the nature of the training data or the network structure, NN-based object detection algo-
rithms may be sensitive to a certain combination of properties of the objects in the scene. In Sec. 5, we
describe how Sim-ATAV combines covering arrays to explore discrete and discretized parameters with
falsification on continuous parameters.
4 Framework
We describe Sim-ATAV, a framework for performing testing and analysis of autonomous driving systems
in a virtual environment. The simulation environment used in Sim-ATAV includes a vehicle perception
system, a vehicle controller, a model of the physical environment, and a mechanism to render 2D images
from 3D models. The framework uses freely available and low cost tools and can be run on a stan-
dard desktop PC. Later, we demonstrate how Sim-ATAV can be used to implement traditional testing
approaches, as well as advanced automated testing approaches that were not previously possible using
existing frameworks.
Fig. 3 shows an overview of the simulation environment. The simulation environment has three main
components: the perception system, the controller, and the environment modeling framework, which also
performs image rendering.
Simulation Environment
WebotsTensorflow
SqueezeDet
PERCEPTION
SYSTEM
CONTROLLER
VEHICLE AND
ENVIRONMENT MODEL
RENDERER
Figure 3: Overview of the simulation environment.
For the perception system, we feed the vehicle front camera images to a lightweight Deep NN,
SqueezeDet, which performs object detection and classification [36]. SqueezeDet is implemented in
TensorFlowTM[1], and it outputs a list of object detection boxes with corresponding class probabilities.
This network was originally trained on real image data from the KITTI dataset [12] to achieve accuracy
comparable to the popular AlexNet classifier [23]. We further train this network on the virtual images
generated in our framework.
For our experiments, we use only camera information and neglect other sensors that would typically
be available on autonomous automobile systems, such as LIDAR and radar. In principle, this means
that the controller that we use is likely more sensitive to the performance of the image-based perception
systems, as compared to a typical autonomous driving system, since the computer vision system is essen-
tially the only sensor information that we use. This assumption was made for practical considerations,
but we argue that this is acceptable for our prototype framework, as this allows us to focus our attention
on the NN-based computer vision system, which is often considered to be the most difficult aspect of au-
tonomous driving systems to test. Having said that, we realize that this assumption is significant; future
work will include adding models of other typical sensing systems, such as LIDAR and radar.
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For our evaluations of the proposed testing framework, we implemented a simple collision avoid-
ance controller in Python. The controller takes the detection box and object class information from
SqueezeDet and estimates the actual positions of the detected objects (e.g., pedestrians or vehicles) by a
linear mapping of the detection box pixel positions and sizes to the 3D space. The controller also utilizes
the Median Flow tracker [18] implementation in OpenCV to track and estimate future positions of the
objects. A collision is predicted if an object is, or in the future will be, in front of the controlled vehicle
at a distance shorter than a threshold. When there is no collision risk, the controller drives the car with
a constant throttle. When a future collision is predicted, it applies the brakes at the maximum level, and
if the predicted time to collision is less than a threshold, it also steers away from the object to avoid a
possible collision. We note that Sim-ATAV does not restrict the controller; our controller can be easily
exchanged with an alternative.
The environment modeling framework is implemented in Webots [25], a robotic simulation frame-
work that models the physical behavior of robotic components, such as manipulators and wheeled robots,
and can be configured to model autonomous driving scenarios. In addition to modeling the physics, a
graphics engine is used to produce images of the scenarios. In Sim-ATAV, the images rendered by We-
bots are configured to correspond to the image data captured from a virtual camera that is attached to the
front of a vehicle.
The process used by Sim-ATAV for test generation and execution for discrete and discretized contin-
uous parameters is illustrated by the flowchart shown in Fig. 4 (left). Sim-ATAV first generates test cases
that correspond to scenarios defined in the simulation environment using covering arrays as a combina-
torial test generation approach. The scenario setup is communicated to the simulation interface using
TCP/IP sockets. After a simulation is executed, the corresponding simulation trace is received via socket
communication and evaluated using a cost function. Among all discrete test cases, the most promising
one is used as the initial test case for the falsification process shown in Fig. 4 (right). For falsification, the
result obtained from the cost function is used in an optimization setting to generate the next scenario to
be simulated. For this purpose, we used S-TaLiRo [10], which is a MATLABr toolbox for falsification
of CPSs. Similar tools, such as Breach [5], can also be used in our framework for the same purpose.
SIMULATION
INTERFACE
SIMULATION
ENVIRONMENT
COST FUNCTION
c < 0?
OPTIMIZATION
HALT
Bug found!
Initial Setup
Scenario
Simulation Trace
c
No
Yes
COMBINATORIAL TEST GEN.
Discrete Space
SIM. INTERFACE
Test Setup .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
SIM. ENVIRONMENT
Scenario
COST FUNCTION
Sim. Trace
EXTRACT BEST TEST CASE
Cost
HALT
Best Test Setup
Figure 4: Flowcharts illustrating the combinatorial testing (left) and falsification (right) approaches.
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5 Testing Application
In this section, we present the results from a case study using an autonomous driving scenario to evaluate
Sim-ATAV. We describe a specific driving scenario and provide the corresponding STL specification.
Then, we describe the testing procedure that we use to identify critical (glancing) system behaviors,
which is based on covering arrays and robustness-guided falsification. Finally, we analyze the results.
5.1 Scenario Setup
In this section, we describe the driving scenario that we use to evaluate Sim-ATAV. The scenario is
selected to be both challenging for the autonomous driving system and also analogous to plausible driving
scenarios experienced in real world situations. In general, the system designers will need to identify
crucial driving scenarios, based on intuition about challenging situations, from the perspective of the
autonomous vehicle control system. A thorough simulation-based testing approach will include a wide
array of scenarios that exemplify critical driving situations.
We use the scenario depicted in Fig. 5, which we call system Md . The scenario includes the ego
car on a one-way road, with parked cars in lanes on the left and right of the vehicle. In the Figure,
agent Vehicles 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are parked. Also, Vehicle 2 is stopped due to the two pedestrians in the
crosswalk. The Jay-walking Pedestrian is crossing the street between Vehicles 4 and 5. This pedestrian
crosses in front of the Ego car until it reaches the leftmost lane, at which time it changes direction and
returns to the right Sidewalk.
1
2
3
6
4
5
Jay-walking Pedestrian
Crosswalk
Sidewalk
Ego Car
Figure 5: Overview of the scenario used for evaluations.
Several aspects of the scenario depicted in Fig. 5 are parameterized, meaning that their values are
fixed for any given simulation by appropriately selecting the model parameters pd . The longitudinal
position of Vehicle 1 is parameterized. Also the colors of Vehicles 1 through 5 and the shirt and pants of
the Jay-walking Pedestrian are parameterized and can each take one of 5 values: red, green, blue, white,
or black. Additionally, Vehicles 1 through 5 can be one of 5 different car models. Further, the walking
speed of the Jay-walking Pedestrian is parameterized, along with the initial longitudinal position of the
Ego car. Fog may be present in the scene, and this corresponds to a Boolean variable that determines
whether the fog is present or not. In all, Md has 13 discrete (V = 13) and 3 continuous parameters
(W = 3).
Figure 6 shows examples of the scenario described above. The images are generated by the We-
bots framework, which implements the physics model and provides the image rendering of the scene.
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Figure 6a shows an example of the scene during a simulation run performed using the Sim-ATAV frame-
work. The Ego car is in the bottom-center of the image, and the Jay-walking Pedestrian can be seen just
in front of the Ego car. The parked cars can be seen in front of the Ego car on the left and right sides.
Figure 6b shows an example of a camera image that is processed by the DNN, SqueezeDet. This
image corresponds to the scene shown in Fig. 6a. The object detection and classification performed by
SqueezeDet is used to estimate where vehicles and pedestrians appear in the image, and the correspond-
ing estimates are shown with red bounding boxes. The solid blue boxes indicate vehicles or pedestrians
detected that the perception system determines are in danger of being collided with, unless action is taken
by the controller.
Jay-walking
Pedestrian
Ego Car
(a) Overview of testing scenario
Pedestrian
Identified
Agent Car
Identified
Agent
Car False
Positive
(b) Camera view and object detection and classification on the image
Figure 6: Webots images from testing scenario.
5.2 STL Specifications
Below is the STL specification used in our experiments:
φd =(pivego,mov.=⇒ (¬pi0,coll ∧ ...∧¬pil,coll ∧¬pi0,coll ∧ ...∧¬pil,coll))
where, for all i ∈ {1, .., l},
pivego,mov. =vego > εspeed
pii,coll =dist(i,ego)< εdist ∧ front(i,ego) =>
pii,coll =dist(i,ego)< 0.
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In the above specification, the Ego vehicle is indexed with ego, and all other objects in the environ-
ment are indexed from 1 to l. Position of an object is represented with x. front(i,ego) evaluates to true (>)
if object i is partially in the front corridor of the Ego vehicle and to false (⊥) otherwise. dist(i,ego)
gives the minimum Euclidean distance between front bumper of the Ego vehicle and the object i. The
specification basically describes that the Ego vehicle should not hit another vehicle or pedestrian. The
predicates pii,coll,∀i ∈ {1, ..., l} are added so that the robustness corresponds to the Euclidean distance of
the corresponding object when it is not in front corridor of the Ego vehicle.
5.3 Testing Strategies
In this section, we describe three testing strategies that we implement in Sim-ATAV. We compare their
performance for the scenario described in Sec. 5.1. Because of the simple logic of our controller and
the nature of the test scenario, it is relatively easy to find test cases that result in a bad behavior with
respect to the system requirement; however, finding test cases that correspond to behaviors that are on
the boundary between safe and unsafe, that is, glancing cases, is a challenging task. In our tests, we
search for glancing cases (i.e., Tˆ ?, as defined in Eq. 1 in Sec. 3.3), where a collision occurs at very low
speeds or a collision is nearly missed.
5.3.1 Global Uniform Random Search (Global UR)
One naive approach to testing the autonomous driving system Md against property φd is to select a
collection of J test cases (parameters pd j ∈Pd , where 1 ≤ j ≤ J) at random, run simulations to obtain
the corresponding traces Td j ∈L (Md), and then check whether the traces satisfy the specification, by
checking whether [[φd ]]d(Td j)> 0 for all 1≤ j≤ J. To indentify the critical (glancing) cases using Global
UR, we use argmin1≤ j≤J |[[φd ]]d(Td j)|. Global UR may not be efficient, as it is not guided towards critical
areas. The alternative methods below address this issue.
5.3.2 Covering Arrays and Uniform Random Search (CA+UR)
To provide guidance towards behaviors that demonstrate critical behaviors for system Md , we use a
covering array, which is generated by the ACTS tool [24], for the discrete variables Vd , and we combine
this with a falsification approach that we use to explore the continuous variables Wd .
The CA+UR method first creates a list of test cases Td j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ J, and evaluates against the
specification φd . The covering array is generated on the discrete variables Vd and discretized version of
the continuous variables Wˆd .
To identify a glancing behavior, the discrete parameters vd j from the covering array that correspond
to the Td j that minimizes |[[φd ]]d(Td j)| over 1 ≤ j ≤ J are used to create the test cases using the uniform
random method over the continuous variables. Tdk that corresponds to the minimum value of |[[φd ]]d(Td j)|
is then taken as a glancing behavior.
The CA+UR method provides some benefits over the Global UR method, as it first uses covering
arrays to identify promising valuations for the discrete variables. One problem with CA+UR is that the
search over the continuous variables is still performed in an unguided fashion. Next, we describe another
approach that addresses this problem.
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5.3.3 Covering Arrays and Simulated Annealing (CA+SA)
The third method that we evaluate combines covering arrays to evaluate the discrete variables Vd and
uses simulated annealing to search over the continuous variables Wd .
The CA+SA method is identical to the CA+UR method, except that, instead of generating continuous
parameters wdk offline, a cost function is used to guide a search of the continuous variables. To identify
glancing behaviors, we use |[[φd ]]d(Td j)| as the cost function.
Fig. 7a illustrates a test run from a non-failing but close to failing covering array test. In this
example, even though there had been detection failures in the perception system in detecting the white
vehicle ahead, they did not result in a collision, as the Ego vehicle was able to take a steering action and
avoid the collision. By utilizing Simulated Annealing over the continuous parameters, while keeping the
discrete parameters unchanged, we can search for a collision and find a behavior like the one illustrated
in Fig. 7b, where the detection failures in the perception for the white vehicle ahead leads to a rear-end
collision.
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: Time-ordered images from (a) a non-failing test from the covering array and (b) a failure
detected by falsification.
5.4 Experiment Results
We applied the testing strategies described in Sec. 5.3 to Md . Fig. 8 illustrates how the glancing-case
robustness values fit to a truncated normal distribution for different test approaches, together with the
mean robustness values. The robustness values closer to zero represent a better performance for the
related test approach, as they correspond to behaviors where a collision either nearly occurred or nearly
did not occur. For each test approach we perform 20 trials, each with a total budget of 200 simulations.
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For Global UR, the average robustness values reported are the mean of the robustness values with
minimum absolute value over the 20 trials.
For the CA+UR and CA+SA approaches, we first generate a 2-way covering array:
CA(2,16,(v1, ...,v16))
where v1, ...,v16 are each the number of possible discrete values a parameter can take. The number of
possible values is v1 = ... = v5 = 5 for the colors of the vehicles, v6 = ... = v10 = 5 for the models of
the vehicles, v11,v12 = 5 for the Jay-walking Pedestrian shirt and pants colors, v13 = 2 for the existence
(True/False) of fog, v14 = 4 for the discretized space of the Ego vehicle position, v15 = 4 for the dis-
cretized space of the agent Vehicle 1 position, and v16 = 4 for the discretized space of the Pedestrian
speed. The size of that covering array is 47, and it covers all possible 2,562 2-way combinations, while
the number of all possible combinations of all parameters would be 512 ·2 ·43.
Each of the CA+UR and CA+SA runs begins with the 47 covering array test cases (i.e., these runs
account for 47 of the 200 simulations allotted to each trial). Then, for the test cases that have the closest
robustness value to their target (robustness values closest to 0), the search continues over the real-valued
space for 153 additional simulations. Hence, each CA+UR and CA+SA trial has a total budget of 200
simulations, which is equal to the simulation budget for each Global UR trial. Also, for the CA+UR and
CA+SA test cases, we limit the maximum number of search iterations (simulations) starting from a given
discrete case (vd j ) to 50, at which time we restart the search at the next best discrete case and perform
another search; this repeats until the total simulation budget of 200 is spent. For CA+UR and CA+SA,
as we target finding a glancing case (close to zero robustness value), we take the absolute value of the
robustness.
Fig. 8 shows that, compared to the Global UR method, the CA+UR method does a better job of
identifying glancing cases and also has the advantage of guaranteeing that any 2-way combination among
the parameters are covered in our search space, while still using an unguided approach to explore the
real-valued space.
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Figure 8: Probability distribution of the robustness values.
The CA+SA method does better than both the Global UR and CA+UR method in identifying glancing
behaviors. As can be seen in Fig. 8, CA+SA, on average, can find the test cases that generate a behavior
closer to the target (i.e., close to 0). The CA+SA approach, while maintaining the coverage guarantees
inherited from covering arrays, also applies falsification in the continuous space, and so CA+SA is
expected to perform better than either of the other two methods. The results in Fig. 8 confirm this
analysis.
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We believe that these results indicate that an approach combining covering arrays and optimization-
based falsification, such as CA+SA, can be useful in testing autonomous driving systems, especially if
specific combinations of some discrete parameters that cannot be directly discovered by intuition may
generate challenging scenarios for perception systems.
6 Conclusions
We demonstrated a simulation-based adversarial test generation framework for autonomous vehicles.
The framework works in a closed-loop fashion where the system evolves in time with the feedback cycles
of the autonomous vehicle’s controller, including its perception system, which is assumed to be based on
a deep neural network (DNN). We demonstrated a new effective way of finding a critical vehicle behavior
by using 1) covering arrays to test combinations of discrete parameters and 2) simulated annealing to find
corner-cases.
Future work will include using identified counterexamples to retrain and improve the DNN-based
perception system. Also, the framework can be further improved by incorporating not only camera data
but also other types of sensors. The scene rendering may also be made more realistic by using other
scene rendering tools such as those based on state-of-the-art game engines.
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